Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 2, p. 275
		26 Nov. 45 following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the Plan Grün to take into account the changed attitude, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall now read item number 2 of this file: "Berlin, 22 April 1938. Bases of the Dissertation on 'Grün.' "Summary of discussion between Führer and General Keitel of 21 April: "A. Political aspect. "1. Strategic surprise attack, out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification, has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland. "2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war. "3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example, the assassination of German Ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.) "B. Military conclusions. "1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since Grün will have taken security measures. "2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail-which is unavoidable, but should be cut down as far as possible-must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action. "3. 'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force. "The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example dive-bombers; sealing of installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons). "4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw 275
		Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 2, p. 275     Last modified: October 10, 1998 Copyright © 1998 The Mazal Library and The Holocaust History Project. All rights reserved. Technical/administrative contact: webmaster@holocaust-history.org Find a typo? Let us know.