Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 2, p. 394
		EIGHTH DAY Thursday, 29 November 1945 Morning Session MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the consideration of Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the following general statements: First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward that end. Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the surface, to have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction. Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they referred to as Nationalist Opposition and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively--that is as an entire group. Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Bürckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, showed: First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the Führer. Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency. Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, who had what they called good legal positions, but who 394
		Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 2, p. 394     Last modified: October 10, 1998 Copyright © 1998 The Mazal Library and The Holocaust History Project. All rights reserved. Technical/administrative contact: webmaster@holocaust-history.org Find a typo? Let us know.