Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 3, p. 66
		3 Dec. 45 "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel." Two additional entries from the Defendant Jodl's diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for an attack, even during the period of negotiations which culminated in the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in the Jodl diary for 26 and 27 September, from Page 7 of the translation of Document 1780-PS. 26 September . . . THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the dates of the visits of Mr. Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Perhaps you can give it later on. MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was the 29th of September, and this answer then was 3 days before the Pact, the 26th of September: "Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only. "Fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions. "Question by Ausland whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: 'Yes.' "1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Führer's opinion. In no case will X-Day be before the 30th. "It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replies. "A question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent early fogs. "The Führer has to make a decision as to which of the Commanders-in-Chief is to have priority. 66
		Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 3, p. 66     Last modified: January 2, 1999 Copyright © 1998 The Mazal Library and The Holocaust History Project. All rights reserved. Technical/administrative contact: webmaster@holocaust-history.org Find a typo? Let us know.