Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 3, p. 123
		4 Dec. 45 "1. Safeguarding of the frontiers . . .; "2. Fall Weiss, "3. The annexation of Danzig." Then, in an annex to that document which bore the heading "Political Hypotheses and Aims," it was stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. But should Poland change her policy and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary, notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated in the Reich at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and this was considered possible at that time with the internal crises in France and resulting British restraint. The wording of that document — and the Tribunal will study the whole of it — does not directly involve the intention of immediate aggression. It is a plan of attack "if Poland changes her policy and adopts a threatening attitude." But the picture of Poland, with her wholly inadequate armaments, threatening Germany, now armed to the teeth, is ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document emerges in the sentence — and I quote: "The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the requirements of defense" — a sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs of any magnitude. But even at that stage, the evidence does not suffice to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland on any given date had yet been taken. All the preparations were being set in train. All the necessary action was being proceeded with, in case that decision should be reached. It was within 3 weeks of the issue of that last document that Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he repeated the demands which had already been made upon Poland, and proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving aside, for the moment, the warlike preparations for aggression, which Hitler had set in motion behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of this denunciation of an agreement to which, in the past, Hitler had attached such importance. In the first place, of course, Hitler's denunciation was per se ineffectual The text of the agreement made no provision for its denunciation by either party until a period of 10 years had come to an end No denunciation could be legally effective until June or July of 1943, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, rather more than 5 years too soon. In the second place, Hitler's actual attack upon Poland, when it came on 1 September was made before the expiration of the 6 months' period after denunciation required by the agreement before any denunciation could be operative. And in the third place, 123
		Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 3, p. 123     Last modified: October 10, 1998 Copyright © 1998 The Mazal Library and The Holocaust History Project. All rights reserved. Technical/administrative contact: webmaster@holocaust-history.org Find a typo? Let us know.