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7 Dec.
45
"As a result of
these steps Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Führer
on the 16th of December, and once more on the 18th of December. In the
course of this audience the Führer emphasized repeatedly that he
personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as
well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the
theater of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict."
As I have said in opening the
presentation of this part of the case, here was an instance where
pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part
in these operations.
The report continues
"Should
the enemy attempt" there is a mis-translation here "to
extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling
and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to
gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance
increasing enemy propaganda activity, the Führer promised
Quisling financial support of this movement, which is based on Greater
Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised
was assigned to the special military staff which transmitted special
missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over
political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs" that is to say, by
Ribbentrop's organization "the Minister for Foreign
Affairs" that is to say, Ribbentrop "being
kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau"
which, of course, was Rosenberg's organization.
Chief of
Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In
the course of further developments he wits assigned to the Naval
Attaché in Oslo . . . . Orders were given that the whole matter
be handled with strictest secrecy." Here
again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi politicians
and the Nazi service chiefs. The information that is available to the
Prosecution as to the events of January 1940 is not full, but the Court
will see that the agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did
bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's,
Document C-63, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit
GB47. The Court will observe that that is an order a memorandum
signed by the Defendant Keitel dated the 27th of January 1940. It is
marked "Most secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N' ; "
which was another code name for the Weserübung preparations
access only through an officer." It is indicated that "C-in-C
of the
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