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7 Dec.
45
hand, Russia will realize that strong and
highly trained German troops are stationed in the Government General,
in the Eastern Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw the
conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests
especially in the Balkans with strong forces against Russian
seizure.
"For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the
answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service, the following
directives apply:
"1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the
East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a
frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be
explained by movements into training camps, regroupings et cetera.
"2) The impression is to be created that the center of the
massing of troops is in the southern part of the Government, in the
Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in the north is
relatively unimportant.
"3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units,
especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if
necessary.
"4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the
antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably
after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be
increased with captured French material on all important targets.
"5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, et
cetera, it, is to be stated that the work is kept within normal
limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won eastern
territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.
"The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent
correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons,
et cetera, will be made available to the defense for purposes
of counter espionage.
"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order
of" signed "Jodl."
Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and
called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more
definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a
general outline of the Army's operational plan. This order was contained
in a top-secret directive from the Führer's headquarters, Number
18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed
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