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10 Dec.
45 merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war with England."On the same page it is stated: "Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of the attack will not be recognized."The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing as follows: "V." that is on Page 2 "I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order certainly understood it as an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive. So we come to the military planning and preparation for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-132. This document contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Last modified: October 10, 1998
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