Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 3, p. 364
		10 Dec. 45 of the Naval High Command covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. 1 shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English translation; that is 4 June: "Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia; Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany." In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says: "6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . . Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly — as far as can be recognized, only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany." The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June: "From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany proves the same thing." Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you. The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative — the "Drang nach Osten" (or the drive to the East) — had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat to German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going 364
		Text: English     International Military Tribunal "Blue Series," Vol. 3, p. 364     Last modified: October 10, 1998 Copyright © 1998 The Mazal Library and The Holocaust History Project. All rights reserved. Technical/administrative contact: webmaster@holocaust-history.org Find a typo? Let us know.