the meeting In substance it says that the moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany and the West was unavoidable in the long run , the likelihood of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance was not great, and even if a war in the West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing of the Polish military strength. It also contains a statment by Hitler that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant since "the Right lies in Victory."

The second unsigned document put in evidence by thc Prosecutor is headed: "Second Speech by the Führer on 22 August 1939", and is in the form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some of these are as follows:

Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. Struggle for life or death . . . destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break our in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war- never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory . . . . The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morning." (That is to say 26 August.)
In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are sufficient points of similarity with the two previously mentioned documents to make it appear very probable that this is an account of the same speech, not as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same.

These three documents establish that the final decision as to the date of Poland's destruction which had been agreed upon and planned earlier in the year, was reached by Hitler shortly before 22 August 1939.They also show that although he hoped to ne able to avoid having to fight Great Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a risk of this happening, but it was a risk which he was determined to take.

The event of the last days of August confirm this determination. On 22 August 1939 the same day as the speech just referred to, the British Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler in which he said: "Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. On 22 August Hitler replied: