It must be remembered that preventive action in
foreign territory is justified only in case of "an instant and
overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment of deliberation" (The Caroline Case, Moore's
Digest of International Law, II, 412). How widely the view was
held in influential German circles that the Allies intended to occupy
Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that
the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the
Norwegian Government. The German Legation at Oslo disagreed with this
view, although the Naval Attache at that Legation shared it.
The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for 13 January
1940 stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff thought that
the most favorable solution would be the maintenance of the
neutrality of Norway, but he harbored the firm conviction that
England intended to occupy Norway in the near future relying on the
tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government.
The directive of Hitler issued on 1 March 1940 for the attack on
Denmark and Norway stated that the operation "should prevent
British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder's
memorandum of 3 October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the
Allies, but is based upon "the aim of improving our strategical
and operational position."
The memorandum itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in
Norway". The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to
the memorandum of the Defendant Dönitz of 9 October 1939.
Furthermore, on 13 March the Defendant Jodl recorded in his
diary:
"Führer does not give order
yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise). He is still looking for an
excuse." (Justification?)
On 14 March 1940 he again wrote: "Führer
has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise"'.
On 21 March 1940 he recorded the misgivings of Task Force XXI about
the long interval between taking up readiness positions and the close
of the diplomatic negotiations, and added:
"Führer rejects any earlier
negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go/ out to England and
America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly
broken."
On 2 April he records that all the preparations are
completed; on 4 April the Naval Operational Order was issued; and on
9 April, the invasion was begun.
From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on
Norway were being made, they were not made for the purpose of
forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they
might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date.