sideration, that the territories of Denmark and
Norway acquired during the course of the war should continue to be
occupied and organized so that they could in the future be considered
as German possessions.
In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to
accept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were
defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of
aggressive war.
The Invasion of Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg
The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was
considered in August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was
being formulated, and the possibility of war with France and England
was contemplated. The advantage to Germany of being able to use these
countries for their own purposes, particularly as air bases in the
war against England and France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when
Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and foresaw
the possibility at least of a war with England and France in
consequence, he told his military commanders:
"Dutch and Belgian air bases
must be occupied . . . . Declarations of neutrality must be
ignored."
On 22 August in the same year, he told his military
commanders that England and France, in his opinion, would not
"violate the neutrality of these countries." At the same
time he assured Belgium and Holland and Luxembourg that he would
respect their neutrality; and on 6 October 1939, after the Polish
campaign, he repeated this assurance. On 7 October General Von
Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare "for the immediate
invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation
so demands." In a series of orders, which were signed by the
Defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for 10 November
1939, but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on
account of weather conditions and transport problems.
At the conference on 23 November 1939 Hitler
said:
"We have an Achilles heel: The
Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr.
If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr,
we shall be in the greatest danger . . . .Certainly England and
France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed.
England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and
Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland
the sympathies are all for France and England . . . . If the French
Army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late
for us. We must anticipate them . . . . We shall sow the English
coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare
with