ing the Greeks to defend themselves against the
Italians) represented a British attempt to extend the war to the
Balkans.
It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against
Greece and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as
early as August of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the
assistance of the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to
inflict great damage upon German interests was made the occasion for
the occupation of both countries.
The Aggressive War against the Union
of
Soviet Socialist Republics
On 23 August 1939 Germany signed the
non-aggression pact with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on
their part conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German
Government itself had been assured of this by the highest German
sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his
Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked by
Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War Diary under
the date of 6 June 1941.
Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany began
to make preparations for an attack on the U.S.S.R., in spite of the
non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned under the
code name "Case Barbarossa", and the former Field Marshall
Paulus testified that on 3 September 1940, when he joined the German
General Staff, he continued developing "Case Barbarossa",
which was finally completed at the beginning of November 1940; and
that even then, the German General Staff had no information that the
Soviet Union was preparing for war.
On 18 December 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 21, initialed by
Keitel and Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations
connected with the realization of "Case Barbarossa" by 15
May 1941. This directive stated:
"The German armed forces must be
prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of
the war against England . . . . Great caution has to be exercised
that theintention of an attack will not be recognized."
Before the directive of 18 December had been made,
the Defendant Göring had informed General Thomas, chief of the
Office of War Economy of the OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas
made surveys of the economic possibilities of the U.S.S.R., including
its raw materials, its power and transport system, and its capacity
to produce arms.
In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the
Eastern territories with many military-economic units (inspectorates,