all changes in their relations with one
another should be sought only by pacific means . . . thus uniting
civilised nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an
instrument of their national policy . . . ."
The first two articles are as follows:
"Article I. The High Contracting
Parties solemnly declare in tile names of their respective peoples
that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in
their relations to one another."
"Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the
settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever
nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them.
shall never be sought except by pacific means."
The question is, what was the legal effect of this
Pact? The nations who signed the Pact or adhered to it
unconditionally condemned recourse to war for the future as an
instrument of policy, and expressly renounced it. After the signing
of the Pact, any nation resorting to war as an instrument of national
policy breaks the Pact. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily
involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international
law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable
and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. War
for the solution of international controversies undertaken as an
instrument of national policy certainly includes a war of aggression,
and such a war is therefore outlawed by the Pact. As Mr. Henry L.
Stimson, then Secretary of State of the United States, said in 1932:
"War between nations was renounced
by the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it
has become throughout practically the entire world . . . an illegal
thing. Hereafter, when nations engage in armed conflict, either one
or both of them must be termed violators of this general treaty law.
. . . We denounce them as law breakers."
But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly
enact that such wars arc crimes, or set up courts to try those who
make such wars. To that extent the same is true with regard to the
laws of war contained in the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention
of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging war. These
included the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of
poisoned weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and similar
matters. Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long before the
date of the Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been
crimes, punishable as offenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague
Con-