of the Tribunal, both these submissions must be
rejected. That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon
individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized. In the
recent case of Ex Parte Quirin (1942 317 U.S. 1), before the Supreme
Court of the United States, persons were charged during the war with
landing in the United States for purposes of spying and sabotage. The
late Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, said:
"From the very beginning of its
history this Court has applied the law of war as including that part
of the law of nations which prescribes for the conduct of war, the
status, rights, and duties of enemy nations as well as enemy
individuals."
He went on to give a list of cases tried by the
Courts, where individual offenders were charged with offenses against
the laws of nations, and particularly the laws of war. Many other
authorities could be cited, but enough has been said to show that
individuals can be punished for violations of international law.
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.
The provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles already
referred to illustrate and enforce this view of individual
responsibility.
The principle of international law, which under certain
circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot be
applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declares
"The official position of
Defendants, whether as heads of State, or responsible officials in
Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility, or mitigating punishment."
On the other hand the very essence of the Charter is
that individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He
who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing
action moves outside its competence under international law.
It was also submitted on behalf of most of these defendants that
in doing what they did they were acting under the orders of Hitler,
and therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts comitted by
them in carrying out these orders. The Charter specifically provides
in Article 8