23 Nov. 45

in the presence of the defendants, and the Tribunal, as well as the defendants, are certainly familiar with the contents of those allegations. I call attention to them now, however, in order to focus attention on the parts of the Indictment which are relevant in consideration of the evidence which I intend to bring before the Tribunal.

My introduction to the presentation of evidence in this matter would be faulty if I did not invite the Tribunal to consider with me the relationship between history and the evidence in this case Neither counsel nor Tribunal can orient themselves to the problem at hand--neither counsel nor Tribunal can present or consider the evidence in this case in its proper context, neither can argue or evaluate the staggering implications of the evidence to be presented-without reading that history, reading that evidence against the background of recorded history. And by recorded history, I mean the history merely of the last 12 years.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, of the U. S. Supreme Court found in his judicial experience that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." My recollection is that he stated it perhaps better, earlier in the preface to his book on the common law where he said, I think, "The life of the law has been not logic but experience." I submit that in the present case a page of history is worth a hundred tons of evidence. As lawyers and judges we cannot blind ourselves to what we know as men. The history of the past 12 years is a burning, living thing in our immediate memory The facts of history crowd themselves upon us and demand our attention.

It is common ground among all systems of jurisprudence that matters of common knowledge need not be proved, but may receive the judicial notice of courts without other evidence. The Charter of this Tribunal, drawing on this uniformly recognized principle, declares in Article 21:

"The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof"

The facts of recorded history are the prime example of facts of common knowledge which require no proof. No court would require evidence to prove that the Battle of Hastings occurred in the year 1066, or that the Bastille fell on the 14th of July 1789, or that Czar Alexander I freed the serfs in 1863 or that George Washington was the first President of the United States or that George III was the reigning King of England at that time.

If I may be allowed to interpolate, an old law professor of mine used to present the curiosity of the law: that a judge is held to responsibility for no knowledge of the law whatsoever, that a