26 Nov. 45
"As a landing of French and
British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a
French offensive via the Alps to upper Italy would be extremely
difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian
fortifications French lines of communication by the Italian fleet
will, to a great extent, paralyze the transport of fighting personnel
from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and
Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan
fighting forces."
There again I think that must be a defective English translation.
' French lines of communication by the Italian fleet," must mean
"fresh lines," or something in that connection.
"If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be
assumed that England, being at war with Italy, would not decide to
commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a
warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.
"The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must
be made depending upon the course of the Italian-French-English war
and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military
operations by these three States. The Führer was also not
thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete
independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he
wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The
attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the speed of
lightning." --The German words are "blitzartig
schnell."
"Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch,
in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out
that we should not run the risk that England and France become our
enemies:
"They stated that the war with Italy would not bind the
French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to
commence operations on our western frontier with superior forces.
Generaloberst Von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would
presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in
the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would
still remain on our western frontier. The French would, according to
German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should
consider the lead which France has in mobilization and, quite apart
from the very small value of our then existing fortifications, which
was pointed out particularly by