26 Nov. 45
of June 1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and
Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on
the 7th of December 1941.
As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at
this point present two documents. The first of these two documents
establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the
attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia,
the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation "Case
Green", so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union,
they had a code name "Case Barbarossa."
THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?
MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser
Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret
directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer's headquarters on
18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more
than six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show
that the planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by
Hitler and is initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant
Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine copies. The captured
document is the fourth of these nine copies. It is Document Number
446-PS in our numbered series.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31.
If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to
read the first page of that directive, the first page of the English
translation. The paging may differ in the German original.
It is headed "The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the
German Armed Forces," with a number of initials, the meaning of
which I don't know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK
chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando chiefs:
"The Führer's headquarters,
18 December 1940. Secret. Only through officer. Nine copies. 4th
copy. Directive Number 21, Case Barbarossa. "The German Armed
Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign
before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa.)
"For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available
units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to
be safeguarded against surprise attacks. "For the Eastern
campaign the Air Force will have to free such strong forces for the
support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations
may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories
will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the
main