27 Nov. 45
the German people. In spite of all
the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would
never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its
own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed
at--and has so happily been successful in bringing about-- was the
fusion of these two forces.
"2. The seizure of power . . ."-- I invite the
Tribunal's attention to the frequency with which that expression
occurs in all of these documents.-- "The seizure of power by the
Nazi Party in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration
of military sovereignty."
That is the German word "Wehrhoheit"--a
kind of euphemism there--"the highness of defense." I think
it really means "fighting sovereignty." Wehrhoheit also
meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and rearmament, with
special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armored and
air arm.
"3. The Austrian Anschluss . .
."--Anschluss means "locking on to," I think. They
latched on to Austria and--"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn,
brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim, but
also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of
materially improving our strategic position. Whereas, up until then,
the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an
air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia
herself was now enclosed by pincers."
I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see
that worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a
"wasp waist in the direction of France," and then he very
accurately described what happened when Austria was taken by the
Anschluss, that the "wasp waist" was "enclosed in the
pincers."
I resume reading:
"Her own strategic position had now
become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
attack pressed home with vigor before effective aid from the West
could be expected to arrive.
"This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult
by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction to
the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation
but one intended to afford rear coverage for an active policy in the
East