28 Nov. 45

southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria .... The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.'

"Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

"The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.

"I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the 'dyed in the wool' Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:

"'Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are "diplomats of the old school." They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.' "

I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that the Nazis