29 Nov. 45
"While Italy openly opposed efforts
at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in, Abyssinia
provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy
and France and England, and to win Italy over to acceptance of
Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in
Abyssinia."
That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German
Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany
extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an
alliance which they called the "Rome-Berlin Axis." This,
together with Germany's alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure
on England and greatly increased the relative strength of Germany.
And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field,
among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for
themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war and
begin to outline time tables, not binding time tables and not
specific ones in terms of months and days, but still general time
tables, in terms of years, which were the necessary foundation for
further aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planning.
And that time table was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen,
in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document
Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach minutes of that
conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last.
In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage
aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and
Czechoslovakia, and in that order.
In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I
have shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to
the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in
Austria up to this period, that is, November 1937.
I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic
preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program
in Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular.
It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting
of 5 November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It
will be recalled that in that meeting, the Führer insisted that
Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space
required must be taken by force; and three different possible cases
were outlined for different eventualities but all reaching the
conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved before
1943 to 1945.