29 Nov. 45
I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a
captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme
High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by
Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler's
mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and
5 of the directive. First the caption, "The Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces" with some initials; "referring to
Operation Otto; 30 copies." This is the 11th copy; top secret:
"1. If other measures prove
unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to
establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages
against the pro-German population.
"4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this
operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on 12
March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give
permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide
the actual moment for invasion.
"5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that
we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our
interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any
violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the
population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however,
resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of
arms."
I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as
Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the
Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:
"Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40
copies, sixth copy.
"Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces Number 427/38,"--with some symbols.--
"Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian
troops or militia units on Austrian soil.
"1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are
encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.
"2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends,
especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the
solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl."
Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available
to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in
some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when
they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration.
We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before