3
Dec. 45
and
for the duration of the war, the threat
by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the
operations in the West, and to take from
the Russian Air Force the most
substantial portion of its operational
base in Czechoslovakia. This must be
done by the defeat of the enemy armed
forces and the occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia."
The
introduction to this directive sets forth as one
of its guiding principles the following
statement — and I now read from Page 1 of
the English translation, that is, the third
paragraph following Figure 1:
"Nevertheless,
the politically fluid world situation,
which does not preclude surprising
incidents, demands constant preparedness
for war on the part of the German Armed
Forces:" — and then — "(a)
to counterattack at any time; (b) to
make possible the military exploitation
of politically favorable opportunities
should they occur."
This directive ordered further work on the plan
for "mobilization without public
announcement."
I quote: "
. . . in order to put the Armed Forces
in a position to be able to begin a
sudden war which will take the enemy by
surprise, in regard to both strength and
time of attack."
This is, of course, a directive for staff
planning, but the nature of the planning and the
very tangible and ominous developments which
resulted from it, give it a significance that it
would not have in another setting.
Planning
along the lines of this directive was carried
forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter
of 1937-38. On the political level, this
planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia
received the approval and support of Hitler in
the conference with his military commanders on 5
November 1937, reported in the Hossbach
minutes, to which I have frequently heretofore
referred.
In early March 1938, before
the march into Austria, we find the Defendants
Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent
of the information about war aims against
Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4
March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel,
enclosing for General Keitel's confidential
cognizance the minutes of a conference with
Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had
suggested an interchange of views. This is
Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the original
captured letter, which I now offer in evidence
as Exhibit USA-81. In his letter to Keitel,
Ribbentrop said:
"I
have many doubts about such
negotiations. In case we should discuss
with Hungary possible war aims against
Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that
other parties as well would be informed
about this. I would greatly appreciate
it if you