3
Dec. 45
States
Exhibit Number 69. This revised directive
represented a further development of the ideas
for political and military action discussed by
Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21
April. It is an expansion of the rough draft
submitted by the Defendant Keitel to Hitler on
20 May, which may be found as Item 5 in the
Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only
five copies were made. Three copies were
forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant
Keitel to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army,
to Defendant Raeder for the Navy, and to
Defendant Göring for the Luftwaffe. In his
covering memorandum Keitel noted that its
execution must be assured — I quote: "As
from 1 October 1938 at the latest." I now
read from this document, which is the basic
directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out
its planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy
quotation from the first page of Item 11, Page
16 of the English version:
"1.
Political prerequisites. It is my
unalterable decision to smash
Czechoslovakia by military action in the
near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring
about the politically and militarily
suitable moment.
"An
inevitable development of conditions
inside Czechoslovakia or other political
events in Europe, creating a
surprisingly favorable opportunity and
one which may never come again, may
cause me to take early action.
"The
proper choice and determined and full
utilization of a favorable moment is the
surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.
"2. Political
possibilities for the commencement of
the action. The following are necessary
prerequisites for the intended invasion:
"a. Suitable obvious
cause and with it, b. sufficient
political justification, c. action
unexpected by the enemy, which will find
him prepared in the least possible
degree.
"From a military
as well as a political standpoint the
most favorable course is a
lightning-swift action as the result of
an incident through which Germany is
provoked in an unbearable way for which
at least part of world opinion will
grant the moral justification of
military action.
"But
even a period of tension, more or less
preceding a war, must terminate in
sudden action on our part, which must
have the elements of surprise as regards
time and extent, before the enemy is so
advanced in military preparedness that
he cannot be surpassed.
"3.
Conclusions for the preparation of Fall
Grün.