3
Dec. 45
tomorrow.
If they want to participate at that
moment it is up to them. "
"Germany,
however, will never play the role of
arbitrator between them and Poland. The
Hungarians agree; but they believe that
when the issue arises a period of 46
hours would be indispensable to them to
find out Yugoslavia's attitude."
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians
proved to be a staff conference on 6 September.
I quote again from Jodl's diary the
entry for 6 September, beginning at the end of
that same page:
"Chief
of General Staff General of Artillery
Halder has a conference with the
Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer
Before that he is briefed by me on the
political attitude of the Führer,
especially his order not to give any
hint on the exact moment. The same with
OAI General Von Stülpnagel."
It is somewhat interesting to find a
high-ranking general giving a briefing on such
political matters.
Then we come to
final actual preparations for the attack. With a
1 October target date set for Case Green, there
was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the
military preparation in late August and
September. Actual preparations for the attack on
Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda
of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to
technical details the timing of "X-days,"
questions of mobilization, questions of
transport and supplies.
On 26 August
the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum
entitled, "Timing of the X-Order and the
Question of Advance Measures." This is item
17 at Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation
the Schmundt file on Case Green, our number
388-PS.
I should like to invite the
special attention of the Tribunal to this
memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest
doubt the complicity of the OKW and of Defendant
Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of
an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in
bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the
completely criminal character of the attack that
Germany was preparing to launch.
I ask
leave to read this document in full:
"Chief
Section L: for chiefs only; written by
General Staff officer; top secret; note
on progress of report; Berlin 24 August
1938; access only through officer: 1
copy
"Timing of the
X-Order and the Question of Advance
Measures.
"The
Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy
air forces by surprise at their
peacetime airports justifiably leads
them to oppose measures taken in advance
of the X-Order and to demand that the
X-Order itself be given sufficiently
late on