positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action."

"General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)" — or as the German puts it — "X-2 Tag."

"General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that... Italy is reserved."

"I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June '37, 5 November '37, 7 December '37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In spite of that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore. "1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber Sternburg, and myself). We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day order" — X-Befehl — "(X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (X-Day minus 1"X — minus 1 day — "7 o'clock). The 'Y' time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour."