3
Dec. 45
Afternoon
Session
MR.
ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, my
attention has been called to the fact that I
misread a signature on one of the documents to
which I adverted this morning. It is Item 31 of
the Schmundt minutes. I read the name "Jodl"
as being the signature on that item. I should
have read Keitel.
In the course of
presenting details of the documents which are
being offered in evidence, I think it would be
well to pause for a moment, and recall the
setting in which these facts took place. The
world will never forget the Munich Pact, and the
international crisis which led to it. As this
crisis was developing in August and September of
1938, and frantic efforts were being made by the
statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of
the world, little did they know of the evil
plans and designs in the hearts and the minds of
these conspirators.
What is being
presented to the Tribunal today is the inside
story, in their own words, underlying the Pact
of Munich. We are now able to spread upon the
pages of history the truth concerning the fraud
and deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in
achieving for their own ends, the Pact of Munich
as a stepping stone towards further aggression.
One cannot think back without living again
through the dread of war, the fear of war, the
fear of world disaster, which seized all
peace-loving persons. The hope for peace which
came with the Munich Pact was, we now see, a
snare and a deceit — a trap, carefully set
by the defendants on trial. The evil character
of these men who were fabricating this scheme
for aggression and war is demonstrated by their
own documents.
Further discussions
were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe
about the time of day at which the attack should
be launched. Conference notes initialed by the
Defendant Jodl, dated 27 September, reveal the
difference in views. These notes are Item 54, at
Page 90 in the translation of Document 388-PS. I
shall read these first three paragraphs as
follows: The heading is:
"Most
secret; for chiefs only; only through
officers.
"Conference
notes; Berlin, 27 September 1938; 4
copies, first copy. To be filed Grün.
"Co-ordinated Time of
Attack by Army and Air Force on X-Day.
"As a matter of
principle, every effort should be made
for a co-ordinated attack by Army and
Air Forces on 1. X-Day.
"The
Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is,
about 0615. It also wishes to conduct
some limited operations in the previous
night, which however, would not alarm
the entire Czech front.