3
Dec. 45
"The
Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces, Keitel."
Two
additional entries from the Defendant Jodl's
diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi
conspirators carried out all of their
preparations for an attack, even during the
period of negotiations which culminated in the
Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in the
Jodl diary for 26 and 27 September, from Page 7
of the translation of Document 1780-PS. 26
September . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Have
you got in mind the dates of the visits of Mr.
Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual
agreement? Perhaps you can give it later on.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be
covered later, yes.
THE PRESIDENT:
Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement
of the Munich Pact was the 29th of September,
and this answer then was 3 days before the Pact,
the 26th of September:
"Chief
of the Armed Forces High Command, acting
through the Army High Command, has
stopped the intended approach march of
the advance units to the Czech border,
because it is not yet necessary and
because the Führer does not intend
to march in before the 30th in any case.
Order to approach towards the Czech
frontier need be given on the 27th only.
"Fixed radio stations of
Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at
the disposal of the Reich Ministry for
Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for
interference with possible Czech
propaganda transmissions.
"Question
by Ausland whether Czechs are to be
allowed to leave and cross Germany.
Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces
High Command: 'Yes.'
"1515
hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces
High Command informs General Stumpf
about the result of the Godesberg
conversations and about the Führer's
opinion. In no case will X-Day be before
the 30th.
"It is
important that we do not permit
ourselves to be drawn into military
engagements because of false reports,
before Prague replies.
"A
question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results
in the reply that on account of the
weather situation, a simultaneous
intervention of the Air Force and Army
cannot be expected. The Army needs the
dawn, the Air Force can only start later
on account of frequent early fogs.
"The Führer has to
make a decision as to which of the
Commanders-in-Chief is to have priority.