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Dec. 45
of the
Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish
rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of
conscription, the reoccupation and
remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those
other necessary preparatory measures for future
aggression which my American colleagues have
already so admirably put before the Tribunal.
During that period — the
preparatory period — Germany was lulling
Poland into a false sense of security. Not only
Hitler, but the Defendant Göring and the
Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating
the non-aggression pact. In 1935 Göring was
saying that, "The pact was not planned for
a period of 10 years but forever; there need not
be the slightest fear that it would not be
continued." Even though Germany was
steadily building up the greatest war machine
that Europe had ever known, and although, by
January 1937, the German military position was
so strong and so secure that, in spite of the
treaty breaches which it involved Hitler could
openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains,
at the same time, to say— and again I quote
— that:
"By
a series of agreements we have
eliminated existing tensions and thereby
contributed considerably to an
improvement in the European atmosphere.
I merely recall the agreement with
Poland which has worked out to the
advantage of both sides."
And so it went on: abroad, protestations of
pacific intentions; at home, "guns before
butter."
In 1937 this preparatory
period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved
from general preparation for future aggression
to specific planning for the attainment of
certain specific aggressive aims. And there are
two documents in particular which mark that
change. The first of these was called "Directive
for Unified Preparation for War", issued in
June 1937 — June 29, 1937 — by the
Reich Minister for War, who was then Von
Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. That document is important, not only for
its military directions, but for the
appreciation it contained of the European
situation and for the revelation of the Nazi
attitude towards it.
"The
general political position" —
Von Blomberg stated, and I am quoting
from the document — "justifies
the supposition that Germany need not
consider an attack from any side.
Grounds for this are, in addition to the
lack of desire for war in almost all
nations, particularly the Western
Powers, the deficiencies in the
preparedness for war of a number of
states, and of Russia in particular."
It is true, he added, "The intention of
unleashing a European war is held just as little
by Germany." And it may be that that phrase
was carefully chosen because, as the documents
will show,