4
Dec. 45
".
. . and so a way to a friendly
understanding has been successfully
paved, an understanding which, beginning
with Danzig, has today in spite of the
attempt of some mischief makers,
succeeded in finally taking the poison
out of the relations between Germany and
Poland and transforming them into a
sincere friendly co-operation . . .
Relying on her friendships, Germany will
not leave a stone unturned to save that
ideal which provides the foundation for
the task ahead of us — peace. "
Still more striking, perhaps, are the cordial
references to Poland in Hitler's speech in the
Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of September
1938. He then said:
"The
most difficult problem with which I was
confronted was that of our relations
with Poland. There was a danger that
Poles and Germans would regard each
other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to
prevent this. I know well enough that I
should not have been successful if
Poland had had a democratic
constitution. For these democracies
which indulge in phrases about peace are
the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In
Poland there ruled no democracy, but a
man. And with him I succeeded, in
precisely 12 months, in coming to an
agreement which, for 10 years in the
first instance, removed in principle the
danger of a conflict. We are all
convinced that this agreement will bring
lasting pacification. We realize that
here are two peoples which must live
together and neither of which can do
away with the other. A people of 33
millions will always strive for an
outlet to the sea. A way for
understanding, then, had to be found,
and it will be further extended. But the
main fact is that the two governments,
and all reasonable and clear-sighted
persons among the two peoples within the
two countries, possess the firm will and
determination to improve their
relations. It was a real work of peace,
of more worth than all the chattering in
the League of Nations palace at Geneva.
"
And
so flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of
Austria and renewed flattery of Poland preceded
the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia. The
realities behind these outward expressions of
good will are clearly revealed in the documents
relating to the Fall Grün, which are
already before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as
fully aware that there was a risk of Poland,
England, and France being involved in war to
prevent the German annexation of Czechoslovakia
and that this risk, although it was realized,
was also accepted. On 25 August of 1938
top-secret orders to the German Air Force in
regard to the operations to be conducted against
England and France, if they intervened, pointed
out that, as the