4
Dec. 45
"1.
Safeguarding of the frontiers . . .;
"2. Fall Weiss,
"3.
The annexation of Danzig."
Then,
in an annex to that document which bore the
heading "Political Hypotheses and Aims,"
it was stated that quarrels with Poland should
be avoided. But should Poland change her policy
and adopt a threatening attitude towards
Germany, a final settlement would be necessary,
notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City
of Danzig was to be incorporated in the Reich at
the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The
policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and
this was considered possible at that time with
the internal crises in France and resulting
British restraint.
The wording of that
document — and the Tribunal will study the
whole of it — does not directly involve the
intention of immediate aggression. It is a plan
of attack "if Poland changes her policy and
adopts a threatening attitude." But the
picture of Poland, with her wholly inadequate
armaments, threatening Germany, now armed to the
teeth, is ludicrous enough, and the real aim of
the document emerges in the sentence — and
I quote: "The aim is then to destroy Polish
military strength and to create, in the East, a
situation which satisfies the requirements of
defense" — a sufficiently vague phrase
to cover designs of any magnitude. But even at
that stage, the evidence does not suffice to
prove that the actual decision to attack Poland
on any given date had yet been taken. All the
preparations were being set in train. All the
necessary action was being proceeded with, in
case that decision should be reached.
It
was within 3 weeks of the issue of that last
document that Hitler addressed the Reichstag on
the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he
repeated the demands which had already been made
upon Poland, and proceeded to denounce the
German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving aside,
for the moment, the warlike preparations for
aggression, which Hitler had set in motion
behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to
consider the nature of this denunciation of an
agreement to which, in the past, Hitler had
attached such importance.
In the first
place, of course, Hitler's denunciation was per
se ineffectual The text of the agreement
made no provision for its denunciation by either
party until a period of 10 years had come to an
end No denunciation could be legally effective
until June or July of 1943, and here was Hitler
speaking in April of 1939, rather more than 5
years too soon.
In the second place,
Hitler's actual attack upon Poland, when it came
on 1 September was made before the expiration of
the 6 months' period after denunciation required
by the agreement before any denunciation could
be operative. And in the third place,