4
Dec. 45
pursuance
of the treaty obligations already referred to On
the 6th of October Hitler renewed his assurances
of friendship to Belgium and Holland, but on the
9th of October, before any kind of accusation
had been made by the German Government of
breaches of neutrality, Hitler issued a
directive for the conduct of the war. And he
said this:
"1)
If it becomes evident in the near future
that England and France, acting under
her leadership, are not disposed to end
the war, I am determined to take firm
and offensive action without letting
much time elapse.
"2) A
long waiting period results not only in
the ending of Belgian and perhaps also
of Dutch neutrality to the advantage of
the Western Powers, but also strengthens
the military power of our enemies to an
increasing degree, causes confidence of
the neutrals in final German victory to
wane, and does not help to bring Italy
to our aid as brothers-in-arms.
"3)
I therefore issue the following orders
for the further conduct of military
operations:
"(a)
Preparations should be made for
offensive action on the northern flank
of the Western Front crossing the area
of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland.
This attack must be carried out as soon
and as forcefully as possible.
"(b)
The object of this attack is to defeat
as many strong sections of the French
fighting army as possible, and her ally
and partner in the fighting, and at the
same time to acquire as great an area of
Holland, Belgium, and northern France as
possible, to use as a base offering
good prospects for waging aerial and sea
warfare against England and to provide
ample coverage for the vital district of
the Ruhr."
Nothing
could state more clearly or more definitely the
object behind the invasion of these three
countries than that document expresses it.
On
the 15th of October 1939 the Defendant Keitel
wrote a most-secret letter concerning "Fall
Gelb" which was the name given to the
operation against the Low Countries. In it he
said that:
"The
protection of the Ruhr area by moving
aircraft reporting service and the air
defense as far forward as possible in
the area of Holland is significant for
the whole conduct of the war. The more
Dutch territory we occupy, the more
effective can the defense of the Ruhr
area be made. This point of view must
determine the choice of objectives of
the Army, even if the Army and Navy are
not directly interested in such
territorial gain. It must be the object
of the Army's preparations,