4
Dec. 45
position
through the engineering of some new
European crisis, is, insofar as it is
concerned with Russo-German relations,
an illusion.
"English
statesmen perceive everything somewhat
slowly, but they too will learn to
understand this in the course of time."
The
whole statement was, of course, a tissue of
lies. It was not many months after it had been
made that the arrangements for attacking Russia
were put into hand. And the Defendant Raeder
gives us the probable reason for the decision in
a note which he sent to Admiral Assmann:
"The
fear that control of the air over the
Channel in the Autumn of 1940 could no
longer be attained, a realization which
the Führer no doubt gained earlier
than the Naval War Staff, who were not
so fully informed of the true results of
air raids on England (our own losses),
surely caused the Führer, as far
back as August and September" —
this was August and September of 1940 —
"to consider whether, even prior to
victory in the West, an Eastern campaign
would be feasible, with the object of
first eliminating our last serious
opponent on the Continent . . . . The Führer
did not openly express this fear,
however, until well into September."
He
may not have spoken to the Navy of his
intentions until later in September, but by the
beginning of that month he had undoubtedly told
the Defendant Jodl about them.
Dated
the 6th of September 1940, we have a directive
of the OKW signed by the Defendant Jodl, and I
quote:
"Directions
are given for the occupation forces in
the East to be increased in the
following weeks. For security reasons"
— and I quote — "this
should not create the impression in
Russia that Germany is preparing for an
Eastern offensive."
Directives
are given to the German Intelligence Service
pertaining to the answering of questions by the
Russian Intelligence Service, and I quote:
"The
respective strength of the German troops
in the East is to be camouflaged by . .
. frequent changes in this area . . . .
The impression is to be created that the
bulk of the troops is in the south of
the Government General and that the
occupation in the North is relatively
small."
And so we see the beginning of the operations.
On the 12th of November 1940 Hitler
issued a directive, signed by the Defendant
Jodl, in which it was stated that the political
task to determine the attitude of Russia had
begun, but that without reference to the result
of preparations against the East, which had been
ordered orally.