5
Dec. 45
production
capacity of Czechoslovakia. That
contributes toward a considerable
strengthening of the Axis against the
Western Powers.
"Furthermore,
Germany now need not keep ready a single
division for protection against that
country in case of bigger conflict.
This, too, is an advantage by which both
Axis countries will, in the last
analysis, benefit."
Then
on Page 5, Paragraph 2, of the German version:
"The
action taken by Germany in
Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an
advantage for the Axis in case Poland
should finally join the enemies of the
Axis powers. Germany could then attack
this country from two flanks and would
be within only 25 minutes flying
distance from the new Polish industrial
center, which had been moved further
into the interior of the country, nearer
to the other Polish industrial districts
because of its proximity to the border.
Now, by the turn of events, it is
located again in the proximity of the
border."
And
that flanking on two fronts is illustrated on
the four-segment chart.
I think the
chart itself demonstrates, better than any oral
argument, the logic and cold calculation, the
deliberation of each step to this point of the
German aggression. More than that, it
demonstrates what I might call the master fight
of the aggressive war case, that is, that each
conquest of the Nazi conspirators was
deliberately planned, as a stepping stone to new
and more ambitious aggression.
You
will recall the words of Hitler, at the
conference in the Reich Chancellery on 23 May
1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign,
Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. I quote
from it:
"The
period which lies behind us has, indeed,
been put to good use. All measures have
been taken in the correct sequence and
in harmony with our aims."
It
is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of
the Nazi leaders. In his lecture in Munich on 7
November 1943, the Defendant Jodi spoke as
follows, and I quote from Page 5 of Document
L-172, already received in evidence as Exhibit
USA-34 — on Page 8 of the German text:
"The
bloodless solution of the Czech conflict
in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939
and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in
such a way that it now became possible
to consider the Polish problem on the
basis of more or less favorable
strategic premises."