5
Dec. 45
My
Lord, I pass then from the breach of treaties to
present to the Court the evidence upon the
planning and preparation of these wars and in
support of the allegations that they were wars
of aggression. For convenience, as I say, the
documents have been divided into separate parts
and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the
total index to their document, which is a
separate book, on the front page it will be seen
how these documents have been divided. Part I is
the "Treaties"; Part II is entitled "Evidence
of German Intentions prior to March 1939."
It might perhaps be more accurately described as
"pre-March 1939 evidence," and it will
be with that part that I would now deal.
My
Lord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the
actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia were
in themselves part of the preparation for
further aggression, and I now — dealing
with the early history of this matter —
wish to draw the Court's particular attention
only to those parts of the evidence which show
that even at that time, before the Germans had
seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were
perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland, and
France, if necessary, to achieve those
preliminary aims; that they appreciated the
whole time that they might well have to do so.
And, what is more, although not until after
March 1939 did they commence upon their
immediate and specific preparations for war
against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a
considerable time before had it in mind
specifically to attack Poland once
Czechoslovakia was completely theirs.
During
this period also — and this happens
throughout the whole story of the Nazi regime in
Germany — during this period, as
afterwards, while they are making their
preparations and carrying out their plans, they
are giving to the outside world assurance after
assurance so as to lull them out of any
suspicion of their real object.
The
dates, 1 think — as the learned Attorney
General said in addressing you yesterday —
the dates in this case, almost more than the
documents, speak for themselves. The documents
in this book are arranged in the order in which
I will refer to them, and the first that 1 would
refer to is Document TC-70, which will go in as
GB-25.
It is only interesting to see
what Hitler said of the agreement with Poland
when it was signed in January 1934:
"When
I took over the Government on the 30th
of January, the relations between the
two countries seemed to me more than
unsatisfactory. There was a danger that
the existing differences, which were due
to the territorial clauses of the Treaty
of Versailles and the mutual tension
resulting therefrom, would gradually
crystallize into a state of hostility
which, if persisted in, might only too
easily acquire the character of a
dangerous traditional enmity."