5
Dec. 45
and it
shows that on the same date the Hossbach meeting
was taking place, a communiqué was being
issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador's
audience with Hitler, in which it was said in
the course of the conversation that it was
confirmed that Polish-German relations should
not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig
question. That Document is TC-73. I put it in as
GB-27. On the 2d of January . . . .
THE
PRESIDENT:. That hasn't been read before, has
it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was
read by the Attorney General in his opening.
THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very
well.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the
2d of January 1938 some unknown person wrote a
memorandum for the Führer This document was
one of the German Foreign Office documents of
which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops
when they came into Germany. It is headed, "Very
confidential personal only," and is
called, "Deductions on the Report, German
Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of
Anglo-German Relations":
"With
the realization that Germany will not
tie herself to a status quo in
Central Europe, and that sooner or later
a military conflict in Europe is
possible, the hope of an agreement will
slowly disappear among Germanophile
British politicians, insofar as they are
not merely playing a part that has been
given to them. Thus the fateful question
arises: Will Germany and England
eventually be forced to drift into
separate camps and will they march once
more against each other one day? To
answer this question, one must realize
the following:
"A change
of the status quo in the East in
the German sense can only be carried out
by-force. As long as France knows that
England, which so to speak, has taken on
a guarantee to aid France against
Germany, is on her side, France's
fighting for her eastern allies is
probable, in any case, always possible,
and thus with it war between Germany and
England. This applies then even if
England does not want war. England,
believing she must defend her borders on
the Rhine, would be dragged in
automatically by France. In other words,
peace or war between England and Germany
rests solely in the hands of France, who
could bring about such a war between
Germany and England by way of a conflict
between Germany and France. It follows,
therefore, that war between Germany and
England on account of France can be
prevented only if France knows from the
start that England's forces would not be
sufficient to guarantee their common
victory. Such a situation might force
England, and thereby France, to accept a