5
Dec. 45
sufficient
colonial possessions but also secure
naval communications and secure access
to the ocean."
That,
then, was the position at the time of the Munich
Agreement in September 1938.
The gains
of Munich were not, of course, so great as the
Nazi Government had hoped and had intended, and
as a result, they were not prepared straight
away to start any further aggressive action
against Poland or elsewhere, but Your Lordships
heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman dealt in
his closing remarks with the advantages that
were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia,
what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent
occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting
the stage for the attack on Poland. It is, of
course, obvious now that they intended and
indeed had taken the decision to proceed against
Poland as soon as Czechoslovakia had been
entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler
said in talking to his military commanders at a
later date. The Tribunal will remember the
speech where he said that from the first, he
never intended to abide by the Munich Agreement
but that he had to have the whole of
Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready
to proceed in full force against Poland after
September 1938, they did at once begin to
approach the Poles on the question of Danzig.
Until— as the Tribunal will see —
until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken
in March, no pressure was put on; but
immediately after the Sudetenland had been
occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir
up trouble with Poland, which would and was to
lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called
justification for their attack on that country.
If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3.
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time
to adjourn now until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning.
[The
Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000
hours.]