German, and the Führer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.
"Count
Ciano, in replying to the Führer's
statement, first expressed the great
surprise on the Italian side over the
completely unexpected seriousness of the
position. Neither in the conversations
in Milan nor in those which took place
during his Berlin visit had there been
any sign, from the German side, that the
position with regard to Poland was so
serious. On the contrary, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs had said that in his
opinion the Danzig question would be
settled in the course of time. On these
grounds, the Duce, in view of his
conviction that a conflict with the
Western Powers was unavoidable, had
assumed that he should make his
preparations for this event; he had made
plans for a period of 2 or 3 years. If
immediate conflict was unavoidable, the
Duce, as he had told Ciano, would
certainly stand on the German side; but
for various reasons he would welcome the
postponement of a general conflict until
a later time."
"Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war."Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the top of Page 5 of the exhibit:
"For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany."Then we get the Führer's answer to those arguments, half-way down Page 5:
"The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in eastern Europe become. From the middle of September weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From