6
Dec. 45
their
heaps of gold and deluded themselves
about their riches . . . . The Western
Democracies were dominated by the desire
to rule the world and would not regard
Germany and Italy as in their class.
This psychological element of contempt
was perhaps the worst thing about the
whole business. It could only be settled
by a life and death struggle which the
two Axis partners could meet more easily
because their interests did not clash on
any point.
"The
Mediterranean was obviously the most
ancient domain for which Italy had a
claim to predominance. The Duce himself
. . . . had summed up the position to
him in the words that Italy, because of
its geographic location, was already the
dominant power in the Mediterranean. On
the other hand, the Führer said
that Germany must take the old German
road eastwards and that this road was
also desirable for economic reasons, and
that Italy had geographical and
historical claims to permanency in the
Mediterranean. Bismarck . . . . had
recognized it and had said as much in
his well-known letter to Mazzini. The
interests of Germany and Italy went in
quite different directions and there
never could be a conflict between them.
"The Minister of Foreign
Affairs added that if the two problems
mentioned in yesterday's conversations
were settled, Italy and Germany would
have their backs free for work against
the West. The Führer said that
Poland must be struck down so that for
10 years" there appears to
have been a query raised in the
translation "for so many
years long she would have been incapable
of fighting. In such a case, matters in
the west could be settled.
"Ciano
thanked the Führer for his
extremely clear explanation of the
situation. He had, on his side, nothing
to add and would give the Duce full
details. He asked for more definite
information on one point, in order that
the Duce might have all the facts before
him. The Duce might indeed have to make
no decision because the Führer
believed that the conflict with Poland
could be localized. On the basis of long
experience he" Ciano "quite
saw that so far the Führer had
always been right in his judgment of the
position. If, however, Mussolini had no
decision to make, he had to take certain
measures of precaution, and therefore
Ciano would put the following question:
"The Führer had
mentioned two conditions under which he
would take Poland: (1) if Poland were
guilty of serious provocation, and (2)
if Poland did not make her political
position clear. The first of these
conditions did not depend on the