6
Dec. 45
September
the lst in order to await the results of
new diplomatic maneuvers with the
English Ambassador?' "Answer:
'Yes.'
My
only comment upon that document is in respect to
the second paragraph where Göring is
purporting not to want war with England. The
Court will remember how it was Göring,
after the famous speech of the 22d of August to
his commanders-in-chief, who got up and thanked
the Führer for his exhortation and assured
him that the Armed Forces would play their part.
I omit the next document in the
document book, which carries the matter a little
further, and we go on to Hitler's verbal
communique, as it is called in the British
Blue Book, that he handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had
heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish
agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from
meeting her obligations. He states in the first
paragraph, after hearing the British Ambassador,
that he is anxious to make one more effort to
save war. In the second paragraph, he asserts
again that Poland's provocations were
unbearable; and I quote Paragraph 2:
"Germany
was in all circumstances determined to
abolish these Macedonian conditions on
her eastern frontier and, what is more,
to do so in the interests of quiet and
order and also in the interests of
European peace.
"The
problem of Danzig and the Corridor must
be solved. The British Prime Minister
had made a speech which was not in the
least calculated to induce any change in
the German' attitude. At the most, the
result of this speech could be a bloody
and incalculable war between Germany and
England. Such a war would be bloodier
than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast
to the last war, Germany would no longer
have to fight on two fronts." —
One sees the threats, veiled threats,
appearing in this paragraph — "Agreement
with Russia was unconditional and
signified a change in foreign policy of
the Reich which would last a very long
time. Russia and Germany would never
again take up arms against each other.
Apart from this, the agreements reached
with Russia would also render Germany
secure economically for the longest
possible period of war.
"The
Führer had always wanted
Anglo-German understanding. War between
England and Germany could at best bring
some profit to Germany, but none at all
to England."
Then
we come to the bribe:
"The
Führer declared the German-Polish
problem must be solved and will be
solved. He is, however, prepared and
determined, after the solution of this
problem, to approach