6
Dec. 45
bring
all that I had said to Hitler's notice.
It was for the Chancellor to decide.
"We parted on that note,
but I must tell you that Von
Ribbentrop's demeanor during an
unpleasant interview was aping Hitler at
his worst. He inveighed incidentally
against the Polish mobilization, but I
retorted that it was hardly surprising
since Germany had also mobilized as Herr
Hitler himself had admitted to me
yesterday."
Nevertheless,
Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time
that Germany had also already given the orders
to attack Poland some days before. The following
day, the 31st of August at 6:30 in the evening,
Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an
interview with Ribbentrop. This document, the
next Document TC-73, Number 112, becomes GB-72,
and is a short account in a report to Mr. Beck:
"I
carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop
asked if I had special plenipotentiary
powers to undertake negotiations. I
said, 'No'. He then asked whether I had
been informed that on London's
suggestion the German Government had
expressed their readiness to negotiate
directly with a delegate of the Polish
Government, furnished with the requisite
full powers, who was to have arrived on
the preceding day, the 30th of August. I
replied that I had no direct information
on the subject. In conclusion,
Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought
I would be empowered to negotiate. He
would communicate my démarche
to the Chancellor."
As
I have indicated already, it was too late. The
orders had already been given on that day to the
German Army to invade.
I turn to
C-126. It is already in as GB-45. Other portions
of it were put in, and I refer now to the letter
on the second page, for the order (most-secret
order). It is signed by Hitler and is described
as his "Directive Number 1 for the Conduct
of the War," dated 31st of August 1939.
Paragraph 1:
"(1)
Now that all the political possibilities
of disposing by peaceful means of a
situation on the eastern frontier, which
is intolerable for Germany, are
exhausted, I have determined on a
solution by force.
"(2)
The attack on Poland is to be carried
out in accordance with the preparations
made for Case White with the alterations
which result, where the Army is
concerned, from the fact that it has in
the meantime almost completed its
dispositions.
"Allotment
of tasks and the operational target
remain unchanged.