"These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it is not the Navy's province to answer, but they also materially affect the strategic possibilities open — according to the way in which this question is answered — for the subsequent use and operation of the Navy.

"It is too well known to need further mention that Germany's present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in the Baltic — bordered as it is by a whole series of states and under their influence — is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If over and above this one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war.

"The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities:

"1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organized that they can in the future be considered as German possessions.

"This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears practicable.

"2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany's main body and which, like the Russian solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile state. Such areas might be considered possible around Brest and Trondheim . . . .

"3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired in this war should result in the existing population of these areas feeling themselves and being politically, economically, and militarily completely dependent on Germany. If the following results are achieved-that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military measures for occupation taken during the war, that French powers of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, armed forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of the question, that the smaller states such as the Netherlands, Denmark,