7 Dec.
45
I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in
evidence as GB-126. It is an original telegram containing a letter from
Hitler to Mussolini forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by
Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini
of the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome
language the Duce is given his orders. If I might read the first five
paragraphs:
"Duce, events force me to give you,
Duce, by this the quickest means, my estimation of the situation and
the consequences which may result from it.
"(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most
dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the
purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in
Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the attitude of
Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten the left flank of
the advancing columns on our enormous front.
"(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have
endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by
mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with
success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result.
Today's reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign
policy of Yugoslavia.
"(3) 1 do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but
nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any
mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole position.
"(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary
measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary
military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been
ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not
to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the
next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and
screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all
available forces.
"These measures should not be considered as designed for a long
period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at
least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising.
"I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce
your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and
with utmost speed.
"(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which
we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that