7 Dec.
45
the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia
without warning and into Greece simultaneously with the formality of
handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin informing him that the
German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis,
the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the
German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that
Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece
returned, he said, the same reply as in the preceding October.
That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as
I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the
Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed,
to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I
can do it, I think, in 5 minutes.
It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was
used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis them selves but
also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based
upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few
hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting
victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration
of war in the case of Poland.
The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the
night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before
the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish
Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the
Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning.
The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5
o'clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May,
while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic
excuses and explanations was not presented until afterwards.
In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the
morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed
that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of
Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M.
Spaak until 8.
The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German
Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the morning of the
28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour
ultimatum to General Metaxas.
The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in
the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia