10 Dec.
45
"The Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces," — signed —
"Keitel."
As was
hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number 21, which I
discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the attack
would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however,
the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the
Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence
of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our Number
C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a
compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It
was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files,
and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each
entry. I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.
Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like at
present to read only an item which appears in the second paragraph of
Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and which is in the text
in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3
April 1941, and reads as follows:
"Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa
now in about 5 weeks. All measures which can be construed as offensive
actions are to be stopped according to the Führer's order."
By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out
to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June —
more than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is a
top-secret report of a conference with the Chief of the Section "Landesverteidigung"
of the "Wehrmacht Führungsstab" on April 30, 1941. I now
offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137.
I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this
report:
"1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer
has decided:
"Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop
movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH
reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.
"2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa:
"Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the
same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector South,
Russian superiority."
Early
in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack
were so complete that it was possible for the High