10 Dec.
45
of the Naval High Command covering the entire period
from the treaty to the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate
conclusively the point I have just stated. It will, I think, be
sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports
from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. 1 shall read
the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English translation; that is 4
June:
"Outwardly, no change in the
relationship Germany-Russia; Russian deliveries continue to full
satisfaction. Russian Government is endeavoring to do everything to
prevent a conflict with Germany."
In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:
"6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports
. . . Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is
considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military
preparations have been made quietly — as far as can be
recognized, only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to
produce the best possible relationship to Germany."
The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June:
"From the report of the Ambassador in
Moscow . . . all observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone
are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to
avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Government
as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events
concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this
view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany proves
the same thing."
Now, that
is the German Ambassador talking to you.
The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union
could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt,
as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning
and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the
Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of
them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The
pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to
attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for
expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version
of an earlier imperial imperative — the "Drang nach Osten"
(or the drive to the East) — had been a cardinal principle of the
Nazi Party almost since its birth and rested on the twin bases of
political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically such action
meant the elimination of the powerful country to the east, which might
constitute a threat to German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum;
while on the economic side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the
plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies,
going