10 Dec.
45
"Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed
with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was
determined to keep her imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister
then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for
the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold
solution. Thereby no over-centralization should take place; but a
solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the
economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced
the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between
the two spheres of influence on a liberal basis. The European-African
hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East
Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he
conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade
agreements directly with the independent states in the European
hemisphere as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly
and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the
Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China,
etcetera. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each
should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third
parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought."
In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the instigation to
war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall
return to him again in this connection.
I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called
military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of further
wars of aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document Number
C-75 as Exhibit USA-151.
This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant Keitel as
Chief of the OKW and entitled, "Basic Order Number 24 regarding
Collaboration with Japan." It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week
and a half after Ribbentrop's conference with Oshima that I have just
discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. We have
turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten
notations, presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have
introduced, is copy Number 2 of the order distributed to the naval war
staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy
number 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations
Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this
Operations Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was