10 Dec.
45
March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression
against Singapore and other British far eastern bases. I shall pass
over, for the moment, other references to the United States in Basic
Order Number 24 and take up that point later.
I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already
been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This
document is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2
weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by
Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant
Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where
Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:
"Japan must take steps to seize
Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again
be as favorable (tie-up of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of
U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet
in comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations
for this action; but according to all declarations made by Japanese
officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in
England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on
spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other
East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby
solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible."
The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the
activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge
their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence
in that paragraph:
"Japan is indeed making preparations
for this action; but according to all declarations made by Japanese
officers, she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in
England."
Apparently the
Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to eliminate this
condition precedent to their performance under the contract.
I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to induce the
Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of
March 1941 he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was
then in Berlin. A report of their conversations found in the German
Foreign Office archives