10 Dec.
45
I then skip again in the German text, and continue with
what appears in the English translation:
"Matsuoka then introduced the subject
of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which
had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a
German written promise of assistance.
"The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions
with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore
in order that the Führer who probably must be considered
the greatest expert on military questions at the present time
could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore.
German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they
could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the
Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity
against the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would
be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.
"Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.
"The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed
new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,
such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could make
available to the Japanese.
"Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of
the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3 months until
they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had
doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which
threatened from America for 6 months. If, however, the capture of
Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps
even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become
extremely critical; and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
"If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this
area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be brought into
operation again only after 1 or 2 years.
"The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore."
On the 5th of April, about a week after the conference from whose
minutes I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again
pushed the Japanese another step along the