10 Dec.
45
suggestion of the German Government to
attack Russia was the subject of a common conference between the
Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters during which the
question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result
is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the
danger which threatens from Russia and completely understand the
desire of their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the
war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese
Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the
war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in the common
interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand,
the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.
"The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive
again in the future on other fronts.
"The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the
Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo.
At present Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England
and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more
defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied
in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces not only to defeat
England and America, but also Russia. It is not good when one part
must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength.
He was inwardly concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who
were of the opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany
could emerge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should
proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further exert
herself to the fullest extent."
I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation:
"Then the RAM again brought up the
question of the attack on Russia by Japan and he declared that, after
all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the south is actually
more of a maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at
best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack on
Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if the
necessary forces for that would be available."
Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about
3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes of this conference
are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit
USA-159. I shall quote only one sentence: