10 Dec.
45
The Nazis' military interest in the United States is
further indicated by Paragraph 7 which I read:
"General Bötticher has made
repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314, dated 26th of
October, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our
knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the
German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme
Command. I pointed out that the matter was specifically a GAF one but
have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own
merits."
Again, in July
1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the
aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Führer signed an order for
further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States.
This top-secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is our
Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-162. I read from the
first paragraph of that text just preceding the paragraph numbered (1):
"By virtue of the intentions
announced in Directive Number 32, for the further conduct of the war,
I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of
personnel and of material supplies:
"(1) In general:
"The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia
will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced in the
near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow,
the armored units will be greatly increased.
"Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have
a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and,
should the case arise, against America.
"The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force,
which must be greatly increased in strength."
From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making
at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The
Nazis' over-all plan with regard to the United States was, however, a
complex one involving, in addition, collaboration ,with the Japanese. In
the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to
undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far
East, they again considered war against the United States.
I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collaboration
with Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit
USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal
will recall that in that basic order, which was issued